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Chapter 2
Determining the Scope of the Local Remedies Rule 
in unclos Disputes
Loris Marotti
Abstract
Art. 295 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) embodies the rule of 
prior exhaustion of local remedies by making a renvoi to cases where the application 
of the rule is required by international law. In the practice of the International Tri-
bunal for the Law of Sea (itlos) and Annex vii Tribunals, States continuously raise 
preliminary objections based on Art. 295. However, such tribunals have never found 
the local remedies rule applicable. In this paper, it is argued that the approach taken by 
unclos Tribunals towards the applicability of the local remedies rule is not persuasive 
since, absent proper reasoning, it fails to align with – or expressly depart from – what 
 appears to be the present state of international law on the topic. Furthermore, the 
above practice undermines the effectiveness of Art. 295 and calls into question the ac-
tual relevance of the local remedies rule within unclos disputes. In the present article 
the approach followed by unclos Tribunals with respect to the applicability of the 
local remedies rule is assessed against a reconsideration of the issue of mixed claims 
and the specific regime set forth in the Law of the Sea Convention. In the concluding 
section the approach taken in unclos Tribunals’ case law is considered in light of re-
cent criticisms pointing out the current improper expansion of the jurisdiction under 
unclos Part xv.
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i Introduction
As in other fields of international law, the rule of prior exhaustion of local rem-
edies is supposed to play a role also in the law of the sea. In this regime, the 
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relevance of such ‘important principle of customary law’1 is attested by Art. 
295 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos or the Convention), 
whereby
any dispute between States Parties concerning the interpretation or ap-
plication of this Convention may be submitted to the [compulsory pro-
cedures entailing binding decisions] only after local remedies have been 
exhausted where this is required by international law.
The reference to cases where the exhaustion of local remedies ‘is required by 
international law’ means that this provision simply appeals to customary law 
and does not constitute lex specialis. It ‘neither broadens nor narrows the exist-
ing rules of international law on the subject’.2
Since the entry into function of compulsory procedures entailing binding 
decisions under unclos, several States in different cases have raised objections 
of admissibility based on Art. 295. To date, in at least five – out of twenty-five – 
contentious cases the question arose before the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (itlos or Tribunal), although not always thoroughly addressed.3 
In two cases, the local remedies rule was invoked and discussed before Annex 
vii Tribunals.4 The total amount of cases in which the application of the local 
remedies rule was invoked might actually not appear so impressive. However, 
two caveats are in order in this respect. First, it is generally acknowledged that 
the exhaustion of local remedies is not required in prompt release proceed-
ings under Art. 292 unclos.5 As the itlos held in the ‘Camouco’ judgment, 
‘it is not logical to read the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies or 
1 Elettronica Sicula SpA (elsi) (United States of America v. Italy) [1989] icj Rep 15, at 42, para. 
50.
2 S. Rosenne and L.B. Sohn (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea A Commen-
tary vol. v (Nijhoff 1989) 81. As observed by the itlos, ‘the question whether local remedies 
must be exhausted is answered by international law. The Tribunal must, therefore, refer to 
international law in order to ascertain the requirements for the application of this rule and to 
determine whether or not those requirements are satisfied …’. See M/V ‘saiga’ (No 2 ) (Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea ) (Merits) itlos Case No 2 (1 July 1999) para. 96.
3 These cases are M/V ‘saiga’ (No 2), M/V ‘Louisa’, M/V ‘Virginia G’, The ‘Enrica Lexie’ Incident 
and the M/V ‘Norstar’ case.
4 Arctic Sunrise Arbitration and the Duzgit Integrity Arbitration.
5 N. Klein, Dispute Settlement in the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (oup 2001) 101–103. 
Even if not required, in prompt release proceedings the prior exhaustion of local remedies 
is not even discouraged. See B.H. Oxman and V.P. Bantz, ‘The ‘Camouco’ (Panama v. France) 
(Judgment)’ (2000) 94 ajil 713, 719.
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any other analogous rule into Art. 292’.6 This is also confirmed by the drafting 
history of Art. 295.7 The reason for such exception lies in the very nature of the 
special proceedings for prompt release of vessels and crews which are aimed 
at obtaining expeditiously the relief and are independent of any local proceed-
ings.8 Secondly, the local remedies rule is usually not considered by the itlos 
at the stage of provisional measures. In the Louisa case, the Tribunal held that 
the issue of exhaustion of local remedies should be examined ‘at a future stage 
of the proceedings’.9 In its more recent Order of 24 August 2015 in the Enrica Lex-
ie case, the Tribunal stated that ‘the issue of exhaustion of local remedies should 
not be addressed in the provisional measures phase’.10 While there seems to be 
no procedural obstacle for raising exceptions under Art. 295 at the provisional 
measures stage,11 the Tribunal has constantly followed this approach, perhaps 
because provisional measures are required to be ‘expeditious and procedurally 
urgent’.12
That said, if one considers that most of the cases brought before the itlos 
are prompt release and provisional measures cases, it is evident that five cases 
in which the issue was addressed by the Tribunal (plus two by Annex vii Tribu-
nals), or at least discussed by the parties, is a quite significant amount.
In neither case, however, has the exception ever been upheld by the itlos, 
nor by Annex vii Tribunals.13 Indeed, the very restrictive approach taken by 
6 ‘Camouco’ (Panama v. France) (Prompt Release) ( Judgment) itlos Case No 5 (7 February 
2000) para. 57. R. Lagoni, ‘The Prompt Release of Vessels and Crews before the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: A Preparatory Report’ (1996) 11 The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 147, 152.
7 See Rosenne and Sohn (eds), United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – A Com-
mentary 81.
8 But for a different view see the Dissenting Opinion by Judge Anderson in ‘Camouco’, at 1–2.
9 The M/V ‘Louisa’ Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Kingdom of Spain) (Provisional 
Measures) (Order) itlos Case No 18 (23 December 2010) para. 68.
10 The ‘Enrica Lexie’ Incident (Italy v. India) (Provisional Measures) (Order) itlos Case No 24 
(24 August 2015) para. 67.
11 The question was discussed by the parties during the oral hearings. In particular, while 
Italy referred to the above statement in the Louisa Order considering it inappropriate to 
deal with the issue of local remedies at the provisional measures phase (ITLOS/PV.15/
C24/3, 9, lines 13–16), India, on the other hand, contended that the Tribunal, in so holding 
in the Louisa case, did not lay down a ‘peremptory rule of procedural law’ (ITLOS/PV.15/
C24/4, 13, lines 15–18).
12 Separate Opinion Judge Laing, ‘saiga’ (No. 2) (Provisional Measures) para. 9; See also E.A. 
Laing, ‘A Perspective on Provisional Measures under unclos’ (1998) 29 nyil 45, 52; I.V. 
Karaman, Dispute Resolution in the Law of the Sea (Nijhoff 2012) 115; N. Peiris, ‘ara Liber-
tad from itlos: How Provisional a Provisional Measure Should Be?’ (2012) 25 The Hague 
Yearbook of International Law 159, 169.
13 The only case in which the itlos seemingly considered the rule to be applicable is the 
M/V ‘Louisa’ Case. As seen, in its order on provisional measures, the itlos put off the 
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unclos Tribunals with respect to the applicability of Art. 295 has been quite 
controversial and a matter of frequent dissent among judges. Legal scholars 
have not paid much attention on this issue so far. More generally, the question 
of what should be the real impact of the local remedies rule in the context of 
dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention has 
not been answered yet.
The difficulty in interpreting and applying the rule embodied in Art. 295 lies 
in the mixed character of most of the claims involving private entities (ships, 
persons, etc.) brought before unclos Tribunals. In the Commentary to the 
2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection (dadp),14 the International Law 
Commission (ilc or Commission) defined mixed claims as those claims con-
taining ‘elements of both injury to the State [direct injury] and injury to the 
nationals of the State [indirect injury]’.15 As a general rule, in case of direct 
injury the local remedies rule does not apply, whereas in case of indirect in-
jury it does. When these two elements coexist, the claim is mixed. In order to 
determine whether the local remedies rule applies in mixed case, Art. 14 (3) 
dadp relies on the criterion of preponderance. The rule will be applied where 
a claim is brought ‘preponderantly on the basis of an injury to a national’, that 
is where the elements of indirect injury prevail over those of direct injury.16 On 
their part, unclos Tribunals have shown awareness of the ilc’s works on the 
examination of the local remedies exception to a future stage of the proceedings. The 
question, albeit discussed at length by the parties in the course of the written and oral 
proceedings, was finally not decided at the merits stage, since the Tribunal found it had 
not jurisdiction to entertain the Application due to the lack of any justiciable dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention. However, even if the 
judgment subsequently rendered in this case does not take a stand on the issue, a hint of 
the Tribunal’s position about the applicability of the local remedies rule in this case can 
be drawn from the questions the Tribunal addressed to the parties during the proceed-
ings. On 11 October 2012, just before the closing of the oral hearings, the Tribunal asked 
the parties, among other questions, the following: ‘Under Spanish law, what would be the 
further legal proceedings which would have to be pursued/instituted, if any, in the pres-
ent case in order to exhaust the local remedies in accordance with international law?’ (see 
‘List of Points That the Tribunal Would Like the Parties to Address pursuant to Article 76, 
Paragraph 1, of the Rules, 11 October 2012’, emphasis added). From this question – to which 
the Applicant did not provide any answer – it can be inferred that the Tribunal finally 
considered the rule as applicable in case at hand. However, there is no suggestions in the 
judgment as to the method employed by Tribunal to reach this conclusion.
14 UN ilc ‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) gaor 61st Session Supp 10, 16.
15 Ibid., 74 (10).
16 See in general T. Meron, ‘The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies’ 
(1959) 35 The British Yearbook of International Law 83; M.H. Adler, ‘The Exhaustion of 
Local Remedies Rule after the International Court of Justice’s Decision in elsi’ (1990) 39 
iclq 641; S. Wittich, ‘Direct Injury and the Incidence of the Local Remedy Rule’ (2000) 5 
Austrian Review of International and European Law 121; C.F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies 
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issue. Nevertheless, as will be shown, it does not seem that they have properly 
followed its suggestions.
The present article analyses the relevant case law and critically discusses the 
overall approach taken by unclos Tribunals with respect to the applicability 
of the local remedies rule (Section 2). This approach is assessed against a recon-
sideration of the present state of international law on mixed claims (Section 3) 
and the specific dispute settlement regime set forth in the Law of the Sea Con-
vention (Section 4). In the concluding section the approach followed in un-
clos Tribunals’ case law is considered in light of recent criticisms pointing out 
the current expansion of the jurisdiction under unclos Part xv (Section 5).
Before analyzing the relevant case law, one further clarification is in order. 
As already mentioned, the real difficulty in assessing the applicability of the 
local remedies rule consists in the mixed nature of the cases in which the ques-
tion arises. This article only deals with unclos Tribunals’ approach in deter-
mining the scope of application of the rule, that is in assessing the nature of 
the cases brought before them in order to establish whether or not the rule is 
in principle applicable. Other issues affecting the functioning of the rule, such 
as the exceptions to the local remedies rule,17 are not addressed here. It suffices 
to note that unclos Tribunals have not very often carried out an in-depth as-
sessment of these issues.
II unclos Tribunals’ Case Law on Art. 295
The application of the local remedies rule was extensively debated for the first 
time in the merits phase of the M/V ‘saiga’ (No 2) case.18 Guinea contended 
that the application of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines was inadmissible as 
the individuals or private entities (the Master and the owners of the saiga 
and its cargo) whose damages were claimed by the Applicant did not exhaust 
all local remedies available to them in Guinea. On the contrary, the Applicant 
argued that the rule did not apply since the violations complained of affected 
its own rights as a flag State under the Convention.
In its judgment of 1 July 1999, the Tribunal first considered that the rights 
which the Applicant claimed had been violated by Guinea were ‘all rights that 
in International Law (2nd ed cup 2004) 145–168; Id., Diplomatic Protection (oup 2008) 
172–181; J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (oup 2012) 712–713.
17 Cf. Art. 15 dadp.
18 Indeed, the Respondent State, Guinea, raised first the question at the provisional mea-
sures stage of the case. However, since the argument of local remedies was introduced for 
the first time only at the end of the oral proceedings, the Tribunal could not deal with the 
objection in its subsequent order. See ITLOS/PV.98/3, 24 February 1998, 44–46.
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belong to Saint Vincent and Grenadines under the Convention ... or under in-
ternational law’.19 After referring to Art. 22 of the Draft Articles on State Re-
sponsibility adopted on first reading by the ilc, which limited the scope of the 
local remedies rule to violations of international obligations concerning the 
treatment of aliens, it then stated:
None of the violations of rights claimed by Saint Vincent and the Grena-
dines ... can be described as breaches of obligations concerning the treat-
ment to be accorded to aliens. They are all direct violations of the rights 
of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Damage to the persons involved in 
the operation of the ship arises from those violations. Accordingly, the 
claims in respect of such damage are not subject to the rule that local 
remedies must be exhausted.20
In the passage just quoted, the Tribunal condensed for the first time its contro-
versial approach towards the local remedies rule. This approach can be criti-
cized for a number of reasons.21
First, by insisting on the limitation set forth in Art. 22 of the 1996 Draft Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility, the Tribunal appeared to deprive Art. 295 un-
clos of any sense. If the local remedies rule applied only with respect to 
 international obligations concerning the treatment of aliens, Art. 295 would be 
meaningless as it provides for the applicability of the rule to disputes relating 
to unclos obligations which have little or nothing to do with the treatment 
of aliens.22 Second, the Tribunal did not give adequate consideration to the 
fact that, of all the claims advanced by the Applicant,23 in the end the main 
question brought before it regarded the allegedly wrongful exercise of hot pur-
suit by Guinea authorities under Art. 111 (8) unclos. As pointed out by Judges 
Chandrasekhara Rao and Warioba in their respective separate and Dissenting 
Opinions, this provision bestows rights to the ships (conceived as ‘everything 
on the ship and every person involved or arrested in the operations of the 
19 M/V ‘saiga’ (No 2), Judgment, para. 97.
20 Ibid., para. 98
21 For a discussion see Wittich, ‘Direct Injury and the Incidence of the Local Remedy Rule’ 
170–177; P. Chandrasekhara Rao, ‘iltos: The First Six Years’ (2002) 6 unyb 183, 274–276.
22 Cf. Wittich, ‘Direct Injury and the Incidence of the Local Remedy Rule’ 166–167. It should 
be noted that the codification evolved in this respect. See Art. 44 of the 2001 Draft Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility and Art. 14 dadp. See also Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of 
Guinea v Democratic Republic of Congo) (Preliminary Objections) [2007] icj Rep 582, 599 
para. 39. According to Karaman, Dispute Resolution in the Law of the Sea 304, ‘the outcome 
in this case would have been the same even if the Tribunal had relied on the established 
case-law instead of Article 22 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility’.
23 See M/V ‘saiga’ (No 2), Judgment, para. 97.
Downloaded from Brill.com11/28/2019 03:10:37PM
via Universite degli Studi di Milano
Marotti42
ship’),24 and in particular the right to be compensated for any loss or damaged 
caused by the wrongful stop or arrest.25 Therefore, the case appeared to be one 
of indirect injury to the State, as such requiring, in principle, the application 
of the local remedies rule.26 Thirdly, and most significantly, the approach fol-
lowed by the itlos consisted in considering only the wording of the Appli-
cant’s submissions without making a finding on whether the alleged direct vio-
lations of the Applicant’s rights were founded. To put it otherwise, the Tribunal 
failed to take into consideration the subject matter of the dispute as a whole. 
In this respect, the Tribunal’s approach differed from that of the icj, which, in 
both Interhandel and elsi cases, ascertained that ‘the matter which colour[ed] 
and pervade[ed] ... the claim as a whole’ was the alleged damage to the persons 
involved, ‘said to have resulted from the actions of the Respondent’.27
In his Separate Opinion, the then Vice-President Wolfrum put the issue in 
the following terms. He first recalled the dictum of the icj, whereby
claims to be exempt from the scope of the local remedies rule have to be 
‘both distinct from, and independent of ’ the dispute of the alleged viola-
tion in respect of the individual involved.28
He then observed that
to decide whether this is the case does not depend upon the wording 
of the claims made, it is rather necessary to determine the nature of the 
injury and the rights involved.29
Accordingly, although some of the submissions were phrased in terms of vio-
lations of rights of the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, it could ‘hardly be 
denied that the dispute would not have occurred without the arrest of the 
24 Separate Opinion Judge Chandrasekhara Rao, para. 15.
25 Ibid., paras 14–15; Dissenting Opinion Judge Warioba, para. 61.
26 Both judges however agreed with the finding of the Tribunal (Judgment, para. 100) that 
in the present case the rule that local remedies must be exhausted did not apply due to 
the absence of a jurisdictional connection between the person suffering damage and the 
State responsible for such damage.
27 Interhandel (Switzerland v. United States of America) (Preliminary Objections) [1959] icj 
Rep 6, 28–29; and elsi 43, para. 52.
28 Separate Opinion Judge Wolfrum, para. 48 (quoting elsi 42–43, para. 51).
29 Ibid., para. 48 (emphasis added).
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Saiga by the authorities of Guinea’.30 Moreover, it was ‘beyond question that 
the arrest of Saiga had negative implications predominantly for the owner of 
the ship, its charterer and its crew’.31 Now, while these latter considerations are 
close to the views expressed by Judges Chandrasekhara Rao and Warioba – all 
essentially based on the predominance of the indirect injury –, Judge Wolfrum 
went even further arguing that the freedom of navigation – which encompass-
es also the freedom not to be subject to illegal hot pursuit – has in general ‘as 
its addressees States as well individuals or private entities’.32 Setting here aside 
for a moment the controversial issue whether the freedom of navigation is a 
right of States only or also a right of ships,33 this means that it is inevitable that 
a violation of that freedom causes injury to the affected ship too. And this is so 
regardless the wording of the provisions invoked, which might not necessarily 
refer to individuals or private entities. Therefore, according to Judge Wolfrum,
to the extent the subject matter of a dispute concerns an alleged viola-
tion of the freedom of navigation, it is impossible to find a dispute over 
alleged violations of the Convention which is both distinct from, and in-
dependent of, a dispute over the alleged violation of the rights of the ship 
involved.34
Even more than the ‘saiga’ (No 2), the M/V ‘Virginia G’ case testifies the con-
troversial nature of the issue concerning the scope of the local remedies rule in 
unclos disputes. Indeed, the local remedies objection was a matter of signifi-
cant divide among judges, as it was rejected by fourteen votes to nine.35
30 Ibid., para. 49.
31 Ibid., para. 49 (emphasis added). According to Judge Wolfrum this was reflected by the 
judgment since ‘[i]t awards compensation mainly to members of the crew, the captain, 
the owner and the charterer of the vessel ..., however, no compensation to Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines directly’.
32 Ibid., para 51.
33 On this issue, it seems that Judge Wolfrum upheld the view that the freedom of navigation 
is a right of ships too. At para. 53 of his Separate Opinion, he held in particular that ‘[t]he 
provisions of the Convention indicate that concerning freedom of navigation the rights 
of States and those of individuals are interwoven. It is significant that – in respect of the 
freedom of fishing – article 116 of the Convention refers to the right of States for their 
nationals to engage in fishing. A similar wording would have appropriately qualified the 
freedom of navigation’. For further discussion, see Section 4.
34 Separate Opinion Judge Wolfrum, para. 54.
35 M/V ‘Virginia G’ (Panama v Guinea Bissau) ( Judgment) itlos Case No 19 (14 April 2014) 
para. 57. For a comment see R. Churchill, ‘Dispute Settlement in the Law of the Sea: Sur-
vey for 2014’, (2015) 30 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 585, 595.
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In addressing the local remedies rule, the Tribunal first considered the na-
ture of the claims made by Panama, namely whether the claims of Panama 
(the Applicant) related to a direct violation on the part of Guinea-Bissau (the 
Respondent) of the rights of Panama.36 Then, referring approvingly to the ap-
proach followed in ‘saiga’ (No 2),37 the Tribunal looked at the rights allegedly 
violated by Guinea-Bissau as set out in the final submissions of Panama and 
noted that
most provisions of the Convention referred to in the final submissions 
of Panama confer rights mainly on States. ... [I]n some of the provisions 
referred to by Panama, however, rights appear to be conferred on a ship 
or persons involved.38
As to the criterion to use in case of mixed disputes, the Tribunal observed:
When the claim contains elements of both injury to a State and injury to 
an individual, for the purpose of deciding the applicability of the exhaus-
tion of local remedies rule, the Tribunal has to determine which element 
is preponderant. In the present case, the Tribunal is of the view that the 
principal rights that Panama alleges have been violated by Guinea-Bissau 
include the right of Panama to enjoy freedom of navigation and other 
internationally lawful uses of the seas in the exclusive economic zone of 
the coastal State and its right that the laws and regulations of the coastal 
State are enforced in conformity with article 73 of the Convention. Those 
rights are rights that belong to Panama under the Convention, and the 
alleged violations of them thus amount to direct injury to Panama. Given 
the nature of the principal rights that Panama alleges have been violated 
by the wrongful acts of Guinea-Bissau, the Tribunal finds that the claim of 
Panama as a whole is brought on the basis of an injury to itself.39
As can be inferred from the passages just quoted, the Tribunal reasoned on the 
basis of the test of preponderance as adopted by the ilc in Art. 14 (3) dadp, 
36 M/V ‘Virginia G’, Judgment, paras 152–154.
37 Ibid., para. 155.
38 Ibid., para. 156 (emphasis added).
39 Ibid., para. 157 (emphasis added). The Tribunal went on in considering that ‘the claim for 
damage to the persons and entities with an interest in the ship or its cargo arises from the 
alleged violations referred to in the preceding paragraph. Accordingly, the Tribunal con-
cludes that the claims in respect of such damage are not subject to the rule of exhaustion 
of local remedies’ (para. 158).
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albeit it did not expressly refer to the ilc’s work. The Tribunal appeared to con-
ceive the test of preponderance as allowing it to consider only the prevalence, 
in quantitative terms, of the Applicant’s claims (as set out in its final submis-
sions) based on provisions of the Convention conferring rights on States. How-
ever, as we shall see, the preponderance method does not really rely on the 
type of provisions invoked by the Applicant, but on different factors, such as 
the subject of the dispute, the nature of the claim and the relief sought. These 
factors have not been considered by the Tribunal when deciding on the ap-
plicability of the local remedies rule. In this respect, the judgment not only 
confirmed the approach adopted in ‘saiga’ (No 2), which was merely based 
upon the wording of the claims made, but also apparently misconceived the 
ilc’s indications as to the test of preponderance.
It is then not surprising that the approach put forward again in the ‘Virginia 
G’ judgment met with dissent by a considerable minority.40 According to Judge 
Jesus the Tribunal wrongly ‘brought into play the argument of preponderance 
of rights, to justify altering Panama’s own characterization of the subject mat-
ter of the case’.41 Indeed, Panama itself, in its Memorial, first characterized the 
case as a case of diplomatic protection,42 despite later insisting on the fact that 
it was bringing the claims ‘based upon its rights as a flag State, as granted to 
it, as a State’ under the Convention.43 More generally, the critics to the Tribu-
nal’s reasoning stressed on the mischaracterization of the preponderance test 
referred to in the judgment which was simply used to confirm and support 
the ‘saiga’ (No 2) approach. As observed by Judges Cot and Kelly in their joint 
Separate Opinion – and as we shall see in more detail in the next Section – this 
latter approach ‘does not reflect the present state of international law on the 
subject’.44 According to them,
[i]t is not enough to say that Guinea-Bissau has violated the direct rights 
of the flag State and that there is no obligation to exhaust local remedies 
40 Joint Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Hoffmann and Judges Marotta Rangel, Chan-
drasekhara Rao, Kateka, Gao and Bouguetaia, paras 3–10; Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Jesus, paras 64–80; Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ndiaye, paras 123–160; and Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge ad hoc Sérvulo Correia, paras 8–10. Criticisms to this approach came 
also from judges who voted in favour of the rejection of the local remedies objection. See 
Joint Separate Opinion Judges Cot and Kelly, paras 1–20.
41 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jesus, para. 78; See also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ndiaye, 
paras 123–127.
42 Memorial of the Republic of Panama, 23 January 2012, paras 15–17.
43 Reply of the Republic of Panama to Guinea-Bissau’s Counter-memorial and Counter-
claim, 28 August 2012, para. 164. See also the Judgment, paras 142–143.
44 Joint Separate Opinion Judges Cot and Kelly, para. 5.
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simply because there has been a direct injury to these rights. The Tribunal 
must assess the overall situation and legally qualify the dispute brought 
before it.45
In the Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, the Netherlands claimed that the provisions 
invoked directly conferred rights upon the flag State and ‘failure to comply 
with the ensuing obligation to respect these rights causes direct injury to the 
flag State’.46 Therefore, the local remedies rule was deemed to be inapplicable. 
In its award on the merits, the Annex vii Tribunal upheld the applicant’s posi-
tion and aligned itself with the previous itlos case law on the matter.47 With 
respect to the unclos provisions at stake, it held that they ‘set out some of the 
rights conferred upon and obligations owed to States under the Convention’.48 
More directly, and without further reasoning, it concluded that the require-
ment for exhaustion of local remedies was ‘inapposite’ since ‘the claims are di-
rect claims brought by the Netherlands against Russia under the Convention’.49
As already mentioned, the question of the scope of the local remedies rule 
arose also in the Enrica Lexie case, although in its Order of 24 August 2015, the 
itlos dealt quite hastily with the issue, which did not subsequently arise be-
fore the Annex vii Tribunal. It will be reminded that the Tribunal decided not 
to address the local remedies issue in the provisional measures phase ‘since the 
very nature of the dispute concerns the exercise of jurisdiction over the Enrica 
Lexie incident’.50 This latter passage is rather ambiguous.51 The causal nexus 
between ‘the very nature of the dispute’ and the need to not address the issue 
of local remedies at the provisional measures stage is hard to see. It is likely 
that the Tribunal only wished to recall the parties, and perhaps the competent 
arbitral Tribunal, that, despite the kind of provisional measures requested, the 
subject matter of the dispute did not directly pertain to the protection of the 
two marines, but to the determination of the State entitled to exercise the ju-
risdiction over the incident. Therefore, the question of local remedies would 
45 Ibid., para. 13.
46 Memorial of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, para. 96 (referring to Art. 58 unclos). See 
also paras 97 and 98 with respect to Arts 92, 290 (6) and 296 (1) unclos.
47 Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (The Netherlands v. Russian Federation) (Merits) Annex vii Tri-
bunal (14 August 2015) http://www.pca-cpa.org (13 June 2017). See J. Harrison, ‘Current 
Legal Developments. The Arctic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v. Russia)’ (2016) 31 The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 145, 148.
48 Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, Award, para. 168.
49 Ibid. para 173.
50 The ‘Enrica Lexie’ Incident, Order, para. 67.
51 A. Cannone, ‘L’ordinanza del Tribunale internazionale del diritto del mare sulla vicenda 
della Enrica Lexie’, (2015) 98 Riv. Dir. Int. 1144, 1150.
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have been better addressed in a different phase specifically devoted to the very 
subject matter of the dispute. Be that as it may, by leaving open the question 
of local remedies, the Tribunal not only followed the same line of the ‘Louisa’ 
case. It also implicitly suggested that the local remedies objection should be 
dealt with by the Annex vii Tribunal in light of the ‘very nature of the dispute’ 
as identified by it.
In the Award of 5 September 2016 handed down in the matter of the Duzgit 
Integrity Arbitration an Annex vii Tribunal took up the question of the applica-
bility of Art. 295 unclos once more. Interestingly, the Award stands out against 
other decisions already examined. The arbitral Tribunal expressly relied on the 
ilc’s dadp and on the Virginia G judgment. However, while recognizing the dif-
ficulty in determining whether the mixed claim was preponderantly direct or 
indirect, the task of the Tribunal was simplified by one specific circumstance. 
The main private entity (DS Tankers) which suffered injury that could ‘be seen 
as giving rise to an ‘indirect’ claim of Malta [could not] avail itself of any remedy 
in São Tomé’, since such entity had already concluded an agreement with the 
Respondent in which it gave up and waived all local remedies available to it.52 
Accordingly, the Tribunal held that
the direct claims of Malta for injury suffered as a State may be considered 
as preponderant. Consequently, there is no need that the private entities 
involved different from DS Tankers exhaust local remedies.53
While the Tribunal did not have the chance to elaborate in detail on the pre-
ponderance test, it is important to stress that the judgment at hand decisively 
departed from the ‘saiga’ (No. 2) and the ‘Virginia G’ approach, which, as seen, 
ultimately took into account only the wordings of the claims made by the ap-
plicants and the fact that rights allegedly violated belonged to them under the 
Convention, as such automatically entailing only direct injury to them.
The recent judgment rendered by the itlos in the M/V ‘Norstar’ case sig-
nals a further confirmation of the ‘saiga’ (No 2) and ‘Virginia G’ approach. 
In this case, the Tribunal stated that it would follow the same approach as 
in the ‘saiga’ (No 2) and ‘Virginia G’ cases by examining the ‘nature of the 
rights’ invoked by the Applicant.54 It then recalled that, among the provisions 
52 The Duzgit Integrity Arbitration (Malta v. São Tomé and Príncipe) Annex vii Tribunal (5 
September 2016) http://www.pca-cpa.org (13 June 2017) paras 154–155.
53 Ibid., para. 156.
54 The M/V ‘Norstar’ Case (Panama v. Italy) (Preliminary Objections) itlos Case No 25 (4 
November 2016) paras 267–268.
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invoked by the Applicant, Articles 87 and 300 unclos were considered rel-
evant to the present case in order to determine the existence of an unclos 
dispute. Without even mentioning the test of preponderance – which was 
indeed applied, albeit superficially, in the Virginia G judgment –, the Tribunal 
concluded that
the right of Panama to enjoy freedom of navigation on the high seas is a 
right that belongs to Panama under article 87 of the Convention, and that 
a violation of that right would amount to direct injury to Panama.55
The conclusion reached in the judgment met with several opinions by judges, 
either upholding and criticizing the Tribunal’s approach. On the one hand, 
while stating that the issue merited further reasoning by the Tribunal, Judge 
Heidar finally confirmed this approach. The Tribunal’s approach was also en-
dorsed by Judges Wolfrum and Attard, who in their joint Separate Opinion 
concluded that although it renders the application of Art. 295 ‘moot in mixed 
cases ... it is to be hoped that this case finally stabilizes the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunal’.56 On the other hand, Judge ad hoc Treves (who also sat as arbitrator 
in the Duzgit Integrity Arbitration) and Judge Cot strongly criticized the Tribu-
nal’s approach. In Judge Treves’s opinion,
[f]ollowing this approach mixed cases to which the preponderance test 
may apply would never exist. The practical effect would be to eliminate 
or drastically reduce the relevance of article 295.57
In a similar vein, Judge Cot observed that
[b]y excessive reliance on the concept of direct injury to the flag State, 
the Tribunal is ignoring the clear wording of article 295 of the Conven-
tion, rendering it devoid of any meaning.58
55 Ibid., para. 270. Like in the M/V ‘Virginia G’, the Tribunal then added that ‘the claim for 
damage to the persons and entities with an interest in the ship or its cargo arises from 
the alleged injury to Panama. Accordingly, ... the claims in respect of such damage are not 
subject to the rule of exhaustion of local remedies’ (para. 271).
56 Separate Opinion of Judges Wolfrum and Attard, para. 50.
57 Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Treves, para. 20.
58 Declaration of Judge Cot, para. 5. He went on observing that ‘[i]t is difficult to imagine 
a situation in which the Tribunal, in a given case, would not invoke direct injury to the 
claimant State’.
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iii Mixed Claims and the Local Remedies Rule in International Law
With the sole exception of the Duzgit Integrity award, the practice of un-
clos Tribunals surveyed above is indicative of a rather restrictive approach 
towards the applicability of the local remedies rule and, consequently, of Art. 
295 unclos. In neither case where private entities/persons were involved in 
an unclos dispute these tribunals considered the local remedies rule to be 
applicable due to the direct nature of the injury caused to the flag State. This 
practice is essentially based on the idea that an alleged violation of an unclos 
provision entails, in and of itself, a direct injury to the flag State. Hence, spe-
cific claims for damages to private persons simply arise from the alleged direct 
injury and do not have to be subject to the local remedies rule.
This approach is not fully persuasive since, absent proper legal reasoning, it 
fails to align with – or expressly depart from – what appears to be the present 
state of international law on the issue, as also resulting from the indications by 
the ilc on the topic.
As seen, under Art. 14 (3) dadp, the scope of application of the local rem-
edies rule depends on the direct/indirect character of the international claim 
brought by a State. While this distinction might appear easy to grasp in prin-
ciple, in practice it is difficult to qualify a claim as direct or indirect where it is 
mixed, ‘in the sense that it contains elements of both injury to the State and 
injury to the nationals of the State’.59 Mixed claims are likely to arise when 
private entities, such as private ships, are affected by the allegedly wrongful 
conduct underlying the international dispute. The claimant State in this case 
is acting not only to seek redress for an injury caused directly to it by another 
State resulting from an international wrongful act, but also to espouse the in-
dividual claims of its nationals when they have been injured by the same inter-
national wrongful act.
The ilc attempted to resolve the conundrum of mixed claims through the 
criterion of preponderance: the local remedies rule applies where the interna-
tional claim is brought preponderantly on the basis of an injury to a national. In 
the Commentary to Art. 14, the Commission further specified that the determi-
nation of the preponderance of the direct or the indirect elements of a claim 
is not to be left to the claimant State, but should be objectively assessed by the 
international tribunal seised of the case by weighing up all relevant elements 
of the claim.60
59 Ibid., at para. 10
60 UN ilc ‘Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection’ (2006) gaor 61st Session Supp 10, 
75 (11): ‘In the case of a mixed claim it is incumbent upon the tribunal to examine the 
Downloaded from Brill.com11/28/2019 03:10:37PM
via Universite degli Studi di Milano
Marotti50
According to the ilc, the principal factors to be assessed within the prepon-
derance test are the subject of the dispute, the nature of the claim and the rem-
edy claimed. As to the subject of the dispute, there are cases where the mixed 
character of the claim does not prove particularly problematic for the determi-
nation of the applicability of the local remedies rule due to the specific subject 
of the dispute. International practice shows that where a dispute involves, for 
example, Government or diplomatic officials or State property, the claim will 
be normally direct, even if the internationally wrongful act has simultaneously 
caused injury to claimant State’s nationals.61 The second factor indicated by 
the ilc, that of the nature of the claim, is drawn from Meron, who elaborated 
for the first time on the relevance the nature of the claim, to be found in the 
‘real interests and objects pursued by the claimant State’.62 As to the remedy 
claimed, the ilc considered that the demand for monetary relief on behalf of 
the claimant State’s national as a private individual is suggestive of the indirect 
character of the claim.63 Yet, a request for a decision on the interpretation and 
application of a treaty (declaratory judgment) allegedly violated is not neces-
sarily indicative of a direct injury.64
Besides the preponderance test, the ilc also mentioned the sine qua non 
test or ‘but for’ test which asks whether the mixed claim would have been 
brought ‘were it not for the claim on behalf the injured national’.65 In other 
words, such test consists in questioning whether a State would have brought a 
claim even if the national had not suffered injury. If the answer is in the posi-
tive, the claim will be qualified as direct. Conversely, if the answer is in the 
negative, the claim will be indirect and the local remedies rule applies. Admit-
tedly, as underlined by the ilc, the preponderance and the ‘but for’ tests are 
essentially analogous.66
 different elements of the claim and to decide whether the direct or the indirect element 
is preponderant’.
61 Ibid., 75–76 (12).
62 Meron, ‘The Incidence of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies’ 87. Such a factor 
found some support in the Interhandel case, where the icj considered that ‘one interest, 
and one alone, that of Interhandel, which has led the latter to institute and to resume pro-
ceedings before the United States courts, has induced the Swiss Government to institute 
international proceedings’ (Interhandel 29). In a similar vein, H. Thirlway, ‘The Law and 
Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1960–1989’ (1995) 66 British Yearbook of 
International Law 89.
63 gaor 61st Session Supp 10, 76 (12).
64 Ibid., 76 (13).
65 This test is drawn from Adler, ‘The Exhaustion of Local Remedies Rule after the Interna-
tional Court of Justice’s Decision in elsi’ 651–652, who relied upon the elsi case.
66 gaor 61st Session Supp 10, 75 (11): ‘If a claim is preponderantly based on injury to a na-
tional this is evidence of the fact that the claim would not have been brought but for the 
injury to the national’.
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It goes without saying that the test of preponderance suggested by the Com-
mission, together with those factors to be considered in order to qualify the 
claim as direct or indirect, does not provide a decisive method for ascertaining 
unequivocally whether a claim should be considered as a direct or an indirect 
one. As the Commission itself admitted, ‘[i]n practice it is difficult to decide 
whether the claim is “direct” or “indirect” where it is “mixed”’.67 The criterion 
of preponderance simply provides some guidance for the international judge 
to ease this difficult task which can vary from case to case.
The approach set out by the ilc has not been met with widespread accep-
tance in legal literature. Among the critics of the ilc’s approach towards the 
issue of mixed claims are those authors who insist on the nature or essence 
of the rights allegedly violated, rather than on the nature of the injury.68 For 
instance, Wittich highlights the circularity of the arguments based on the pre-
ponderance or the ‘but for’ tests:
[T]he answer to the question when the element of direct injury prevails 
over that of indirect injury presupposes the prior determination of what 
distinguishes one from the other.69
This goes in particular for the three factors to be assessed through the prepon-
derance method. Apart from those cases well established in practice (involving 
State property and Government or public officials), the subject of the dispute 
cannot be taken as a decisive factor for all possible cases. It does not provide 
a general criterion which helps distinguishing direct claims from claims of 
diplomatic protection, but simply takes account of what have been decided 
in practice. The remedy sought is still not determinant, first, because of the 
frequent practice of States seeking ‘mixed’ remedies in international claims;70 
secondly, it has been shown that such factor has not always been accorded a 
decisive weight in case law.71 The nature of the claim, finally, is a quite ambigu-
ous factor. Rather than being elements for determining the direct/indirect na-
ture of the claim, the ‘real interests and objects pursued by the claimant State’ 
can be discerned only once it has been ascertained that the claim is one of 
diplomatic protection or direct injury. In this sense, the determination of the 
67 Ibid., 74 (10).
68 Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection 179–181, and Wittich, ‘Direct Injury and the Incidence 
of the Local Remedy Rule’ 181–187.
69 Wittich, ‘Direct Injury and the Incidence of the Local Remedy Rule’ 136.
70 See for discussion UN ilc Special Rapporteur J Dugard ‘Second Report on Diplomatic 
Protection’ (28 February 2001) UN Doc A/CN.4/514, 14, paras 28–30.
71 Wittich, ‘Direct Injury and the Incidence of the Local Remedy Rule’ 170 and 182.
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factor that should help in assessing the direct/indirect nature of claim would 
depend, in turn, on the nature of the claim itself.72
According to the critics of the ilc approach, what really counts, ultimately, 
is the nature or the essence of the right(s) allegedly violated. In order to es-
tablish whether a claim pertains to a case of diplomatic protection or a case 
of direct injury it is essential to enquire about the primary norm, since any 
claim, ‘whatever it may be and whatever relief is sought by it, depends on the 
substantive right on which it is based’.73 Therefore, one should look first at the 
primary norm allegedly violated and determine
whether the right invoked has for its specific or primary object the pro-
tection of the private individuals involved as the ultimate beneficiary of 
this right, even if the formal holder of the relevant right is the State.74
Admittedly, the ‘nature of the right(s) approach’ has some merits especially 
in that it is grounded on the distinction between the formal right-holders and 
right-beneficiaries of a certain norm which may not  necessarily coincide. It is 
not enough, for instance, to state that since Art. 87 unclos formally accords 
the freedom of navigation to States any violation of that right would for this 
reason amount to a direct injury to the State. Following this approach, however, 
one could not rely simply on the interpretation of a certain norm in order to 
determine who are the actual benefici ries of the right provided by that norm. 
Regard must always be given to the specific context and circumstances of the 
case. Indeed, context and circumstances might either show that the State, be-
ing the formal right-holder, was also as the primary right-beneficiary in that 
specific case – and consequently had been directly injured by the breach of the 
relevant norm –, or that the actual beneficiary of that State’s right was – in that 
specific case – primarily the individual or the private entity affected directly by 
the wrongful conduct, thus giving rise to an indirect claim by the State. That 
said, it should be observed that the context and circumstances to be considered 
in order to assess the possible discrepancy between the right-holder and the 
right-beneficiaries in a specific case include, in fact, those factors underpinning 
the preponderance test, namely the subject of the dispute, the nature of the 
claim and the remedy sought.
72 Ibid., 135.
73 Ibid., 137. As Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection 181 put it, ‘it is really the nature of the 
‘right’ violated as being preponderantly one relating to an alien or his property that needs 
to be considered in determining the indirectness of the injury’.
74 Wittich, ‘Direct Injury and the Incidence of the Local Remedy Rule’ 182.
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It can therefore reasonably be assumed that the two approaches of the ‘nature 
of the right’ and the ‘preponderance’ are not mutually exclusive, but can be 
combined and reconciled. The determination of the direct or indirect nature 
of the claim should accordingly start first from an inquiry into the right alleg-
edly violated. The analysis should then move to the context and circumstances 
of the case, which means taking into account the factors of the preponderance 
test.
Together with the nature of the rights allegedly violated and the factors of 
the test of preponderance, an even more comprehensive enquire into the dis-
pute dividing the parties would also help in determining the nature (direct/
indirect) of the claim. As observed by Judges Cot and Kelly, in carrying out 
this task the international judge ‘must assess the overall situation and legally 
qualify the dispute brought before it’.75 In this respect, that complex operation 
consisting in the characterization of the dispute may serve not only to identify 
the object of the claim, but also to provide some further help in the determi-
nation of the nature of the claim. As an Annex vii Tribunal summarized this 
operation in the award rendered in the Chagos case,
it is for the Tribunal itself ‘while giving particular attention to the formu-
lation of the dispute chosen by the Applicant, to determine on an objec-
tive basis the dispute dividing the parties, by examining the position of 
both parties’ ... and in the process ‘to isolate the real issue in the case and 
to identify the object of the claim’.76
This task requires the international tribunal to consider also the ‘context 
of the submission’ and ‘the manner in which it has been presented’, namely 
all other factors that may help in objectively establish the dispute ‘actually 
separating the Parties’.77 An assessment of the context of the submission could 
shed light on a series of circumstances that might help the tribunal to deem 
the international claim preponderantly direct or indirect in nature. For in-
stance, where a claim refers to a dispute having deep historical roots between 
75 M/V ‘Virginia G’, Joint Separate Opinion Judges Cot and Kelly, para. 13.
76 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. United Kingdom) Annex vii Tri-
bunal (18 March 2015) http://www.pca-cpa.org (13 June 2017) para. 208, quoting Fisheries 
Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), Jurisdiction of the Court, Judgment of 4 December 1998, 
[1998] icj Rep. 432, at 448, para. 30, and Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment 
of 20 December 1974, [1974] icj Rep. 457, at 466, para. 30.
77 Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration para. 229. See S. Talmon, ‘The Chagos Marine 
Protected Area Arbitration: Expansion of the Jurisdiction of unclos Part xv Courts and 
Tribunals’ (2016) 65 iclq 927, 933–934.
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two States or having triggered a large amount of high-level diplomatic cor-
respondence between the parties, this might suggest the direct, or predomi-
nantly direct, nature of that specific claim. Conversely, where the context 
reveals a scarce involvement of the claimant government since the origins of 
the dispute, and a subsequent intervention only after part of local remedies 
have been exhausted, this might display the espousal or indirect character of 
the international claim.78
True, the process of characterizing a dispute remains an ‘inherently subjec-
tive exercise’.79 Likewise, the process of determining the nature of the claim for 
the purpose of establishing the applicability of the local remedies rule requires 
always an operation of weighing and balancing the different factors that the 
tribunal considers of relevance on a case-by-case basis. But it is one thing for 
an international tribunal to enjoy a certain margin of discretion in establishing 
the nature of a claim and another thing to exercise such discretionary power 
absent careful legal reasoning, as seems to have been done by unclos Tribu-
nals thus far.
iv Mixed Claims and the Law of the Sea: A Special Regime?
The above observations on mixed claims can also be applied to the freedom 
of navigation and related rights which are usually at stake when private en-
tities are involved in unclos disputes. While in some unclos provisions 
(such as Art. 111 (8))80 private entities are expressly regarded as the effective 
78 In this respect, Judge Cot, in his Declaration appended to the itlos judgment in the 
M/V ‘Norstar’ Case, stressed the very little participation of Panama’s authorities during 
the proceedings before the Tribunal. In his language, ‘[p]reponderance of direct injury to 
Panama in the present case is all the more noticeable when considering the very discreet 
presence of the Panamanian authorities throughout the proceedings. ... The written and 
oral proceedings were led by Mr Carreyó, member of the bar of Panama and representa-
tive of the Norwegian owner of the Norstar, Mr Mörch. Nothing prevents a State from ap-
pointing a private person as agent in a litigation brought before an international tribunal. 
However, I cannot help but notice that Panama did not find it necessary to ask one of its 
officials to plead during the hearing. The only official of Panama was the very silent Ship 
Registration Officer of the Consulate General of Panama in Hamburg. To say the least, it 
was quite an unusual situation for litigation before a public international law court or 
tribunal’ (paras 6–7).
79 Talmon, ‘The Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration: Expansion of the Jurisdiction of 
unclos Part xv Courts and Tribunals’ 934.
80 This provision reads as follows: ‘Where a ship has been stopped or arrested outside the 
territorial sea in circumstances which do not justify the exercise of the right of hot pursuit, 
it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may have been thereby sustained’.
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beneficiaries of the norm, if not the formal holders of the right therein pro-
vided, the freedom of navigation remains a right conceived as having an inter-
state character which is placed in a ‘State-centred regime’, such as the law of 
the sea.81 As recently observed by the current Registrar of the itlos, Philippe 
Gautier, it is possible to consider that also a provision like Art. 111 (8) unclos 
has
an inter-State character on the ground that it constitutes an exception to 
the right of navigation on the high seas, a right clearly granted to the flag 
State under Article 90 of the Convention, and to the right of that State 
to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas over ships flying its 
flag, as provided in Article 92 of the Convention.82
This notwithstanding, one cannot but share the view that, since navigation at 
sea is today mostly undertaken by private entities, these latter are ‘[t]he main 
direct beneficiaries of the freedom of navigation’.83 That is not to say that pri-
vate entities (ships, vessels) are formal holders of freedom of navigation to-
gether with their flag States, but simply that they are also allocated the benefits 
of this right, and that de facto they almost always primarily enjoy such benefits.
Under this perspective, while Vice-President Wolfrum’s suggestion in ‘saiga’ 
(No 2) that the freedom of navigation is also a right of ships seems to rest on 
an ‘extremely progressive interpretation of the freedom of navigation’,84 the 
method employed by him appears nonetheless quite sound. As seen, he point-
ed out that the determination of the nature of the claim does not depend upon 
the wording of the claim made. He then combined an assessment of the nature 
of the right at stake (the freedom of navigation) – stressing the nature ‘neces-
sarily’ mixed of disputes involving private ships – with considerations relating 
to the circumstances of the arrest of the saiga, which had ‘negative implica-
tions predominantly for the owner of the ship, its charterer and its crew’.85
81 I. Papanicolopulu, ‘Human Rights and the Law of the Sea’ in D. Attard, M. Fitzmaurice and 
N.A. Martínez Gutiérrez (eds), The imli Manual on International Maritime Law: Volume 
I: The Law of the Sea (oup 2014) 510.
82 P. Gautier, ‘On the Classification of Obligations in International Law’, in H.P. Hestermeyer 
et al. (eds), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity: Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum 
vol. I (Brill 2012) 869, note 63.
83 P. Wendel, State Responsibility for Interferences with the Freedom of Navigation in Public 
International Law (Springer 2007) 86: ‘Only indirectly, their States of origin and the States 
importing or exporting goods carried by maritime transport benefit from the freedom of 
navigation’.
84 Ibid., at 84.
85 Separate Opinion of Vice-President Wolfrum, para. 49.
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It should then appear clear from the above considerations relating to mixed 
claims in international law that the approach towards the local remedies rule 
followed by unclos Tribunals does not find clear support in international 
practice and falls short of adequate motivation. If everything ultimately de-
pends on the wording of the applicant’s submissions and on the right-holder 
as formally identified by the invoked provision, it is apparent that unclos Tri-
bunals would never find applicable the local remedies rule. Indeed, by employ-
ing these criteria, it would be relatively painless for applicants to circumvent 
the local remedies rule even where the claim is basically espousal in nature. 
More generally, this approach fails to recognize the necessarily mixed nature 
of disputes involving private ships and hinders the local remedies rule from 
functioning properly.
Having said this, one might be tempted to justify such approach by consid-
ering the local remedies rule as generally not applicable to unclos disputes 
involving private entities due to the ‘special regime’ in which these disputes are 
supposedly enclosed. An argument of this kind was adopted by the icj in the 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals case, where none of the suggestions coming 
from the then ongoing work of the ilc was even considered by the Court when 
assessing the character of Mexico’s claims.86 In that case, the Court simply re-
lied on the ‘special circumstances of interdependence of the rights of the State 
and of individual rights’ in the regime established by the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations (vccr). Accordingly, Mexico could request the Court to 
rule on the violation of rights which it claimed to have suffered ‘both directly 
and through the violation of individual rights conferred on Mexican nationals 
under Art. 36, paragraph 1 (b) [vccr]’. In the Court’s view, Mexico’s claim of 
diplomatic protection was absorbed by its direct claim because of that special 
interdependence between State and individual rights in the vccr.87 Conse-
quently, the duty to exhaust local remedies did not apply to such request.88
According to one author, in Avena the Court ‘tried to establish a special legal 
regime that would constitute an exception to the standard practice’.89 Shifting 
86 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) [2004] icj Rep. 
12. See the Separate Opinion of Judge Vereshchetin, Ibid., at 79, and the Separate Opinion 
of Judge Parra-Aranguren, Ibid., 88. Among commentators see the critical observations 
by A. Künzli, ‘Case Concerning Mexican Nationals’ (2005) 18 ljil 49, and by E. Milano, 
‘Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights before the i.c.j.’ (2004) 35 nyil 85.
87 See A. Pellet, ‘La seconde mort d’Euripide Mavrommatis? Notes sur le projet de la c.d.i. 
sur la protection diplomatique’, in N. Angelet et al (eds), Droit du pouvoir, pouvoir du 
droit  – Mélanges offerts à Jean Salmon (Bruylant 2007) 1359, 1374.
88 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals, para. 40.
89 Künzli, ‘Case Concerning Mexican Nationals’ 53.
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the focus to the unclos dispute settlement regime, it seems however that a 
similar ‘special legal regime’ would be hardly justified. Suffice it to recall here 
that Art. 295 unclos expressly provides for the local remedies rule by making 
a renvoi to the customary international law on the subject. Tacit or implied ab-
rogation of Art. 295 would not be tenable since, as confirmed by the icj in the 
elsi judgment, one cannot accept that
an important principle of customary international law should be held to 
have been tacitly dispensed with, in the absence of any words making 
clear an intention to do so.90
Indeed, the travaux préparatoires of Art. 295 confirm that, after several discus-
sions on the subject, it was understood that the customary rules relating to the 
exhaustion of local remedies rule would apply also to law of the sea disputes.91 
Accordingly, it can be reasonably argued that unclos Tribunals’ approach to-
wards Art. 295 – insofar as it precludes de facto the applicability of the local 
remedies rule embodied therein – is in contrast with an established principle 
of treaty interpretation, that of the ‘effectiveness’, which, as known, aims at 
avoiding that a treaty provision is interpreted in such a way that would render 
it ‘devoid of purport and effect’.92
Once excluded the possibility of a ‘special legal regime’, there may still be 
some temptation to infer the existence of one ‘special exception’ to the local 
remedies rule from the so-called ‘ship-as-a-unit’ doctrine, as codified by the 
same ilc in Art. 18 dadp.93 unclos Tribunals frequently resort to this doc-
trine. The Arctic Sunrise case provides an interesting example in this regard. 
In this case, besides claiming its standing to invoke Russia’s responsibility 
for breaches of the obligations owed to it as a flag State, the Netherlands also 
claimed to have standing to invoke Russia’s responsibility for injury caused to 
all persons on board the ship flying its flag for the breach of individual rights. 
90 elsi, para 50.
91 Rosenne and Sohn, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea – A Commentary 
79–81.
92 Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania) 
(Merits) [1949] icj Rep 4, 24.
93 ‘The right of the State of nationality of the members of the crew of a ship to exercise dip-
lomatic protection is not affected by the right of the State of nationality of a ship to seek 
redress on behalf of such crew members, irrespective of their nationality, when they have 
been injured in connection with an injury to the vessel resulting from an internationally 
wrongful act’.
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According to it, ‘these rights are to be considered as part of the direct claim, 
not subject to the exhaustion of local remedies’.94 In this respect, the arbitral 
Tribunal resorted to the ship-as-a-unit concept – as the itlos did in its pre-
vious order on provisional measures –95 and found that the Netherlands was 
entitled to
bring claims in respect of alleged violations of its rights under the Con-
vention which resulted in injury or damage to the ship, the crew, all per-
sons and objects on board, as well as its owner and every person involved 
or interested in its operations.96
In other words, this second claim by the Netherlands was considered by the 
Tribunal as merely concerning the scope of the Netherlands’ standing as flag 
State, which was extended to include also all persons falling within the ship-
as-a-unit concept.97 A difference stance was instead taken by the Netherlands 
with respect to alternative claim of diplomatic protection on behalf of two 
Dutch nationals on board the Arctic Sunrise for the injuries suffered by these 
nationals caused by the breach of the same individual rights allegedly violated 
by Russia. This standing was indeed considered by the Netherlands to be sub-
ject, in principle, to the exhaustion of local remedies rule and nationality of 
claims rule.98 However, the Tribunal finally acknowledged that, since it had 
already found that the Netherlands had standing in respect of all persons on 
94 Memorial of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, para. 106.
95 The Arctic Sunrise Case (The Netherlands v. Russian Federation) (Provisional Measures) it-
los Case No 22 (22 November 2013). For a discussion, M.T. Drenan, ‘Gone Overboard: 
Why the Arctic Sunrise Case Signals an Over-Expansion of the Ship-As-A-Unit Concept 
in the Diplomatic Protection Context’ (2014) 45 The California Western International Law 
Journal 109.
96 Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, Award, para. 175: ‘The Tribunal accepts that all persons on board 
the Arctic Sunrise at the relevant times are part of the unit of the ship and therefore fall 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Netherlands as flag State. The nationality of the in-
dividuals is not relevant. The Netherlands is not exercising diplomatic protection in the 
classic sense over all of the individuals on board; it can only do that with respect to the 
Dutch nationals on board. Rather, the Netherlands is acting in its capacity as the flag State 
of the Arctic Sunrise, with exclusive jurisdiction over the vessel within the eez of Russia’.
97 Ibid., para. 175.
98 However, the Netherlands submitted that the local remedies rule was not required in the 
present case due to the absence of a jurisdictional connection between the injured per-
sons and the allegedly responsible State. See Memorial of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, paras 111–114.
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board the Arctic Sunrise, it was unnecessary to consider separately the claim of 
diplomatic protection on behalf of the Netherlands’ two nationals.99 Thus, it 
did not elaborate on the local remedies issue.
In so deciding, the Tribunal seemingly upheld the Netherlands’ implicit 
contention that the local remedies rule does not have relevance when a flag 
State is acting also on behalf of the ship-as-a-unit. True, the Netherlands ‘was 
not exercising diplomatic protection in the classic sense over all of the individ-
uals on board’.100 As also acknowledged by the ilc in the Commentary to Art. 
18 dadp, the right of the flag State to seek redress in respect of the members 
of the ship’s crew cannot be characterized as diplomatic protection when the 
bond of nationality between the flag State and all members of a ship’s crew is 
lacking.101 Nevertheless, with specific regard to the local remedies rule, there is 
nothing in the works of the Commission that might suggest that, in principle, 
the rule is not applicable when a State brings a case on behalf of a ship-as-
a-unit. As seen, the applicability of the local remedies rule depends on the 
interplay between direct and indirect elements of a claim and not on the type 
of protection accorded by a State (diplomatic protection in the classic sense 
or protection based on the ship-as-a-unit concept). In other words, the protec-
tion accorded on the basis of the ship-as-a-unit doctrine does not constitute, 
in and of itself, an exception to the local remedies rule.102 Rather, cases where 
the doctrine is resorted to should trigger the presumption that the local rem-
edies rule is in principle applicable, without prejudice to the applicability of 
possible exceptions to it.
That is the reason why in the Arctic Sunrise award the arbitral Tribunal 
should have considered more thoroughly the Netherlands’ contention about 
99 Arctic Sunrise Arbitration, Award, para. 179.
100 Ibid., para. 175.
101 gaor 61st Session Supp 10, 91 (1). The ilc however admits that ‘there is nevertheless a 
close resemblance between this type of protection and diplomatic protection’.
102 See contra A. Cannone, ‘L’ordinanza del Tribunale internazionale del diritto del mare 
sulla vicenda della Enrica Lexie’ 1150, referring to the Enrica Lexie case, who seems to con-
ceive the protection to the ship-as-a-unit as a reason for excluding the applicability of the 
local remedies rule. In a similar fashion, see L. Condorelli, ‘La protection diplomatique 
et l’évolution de son domaine d’application’ (2003) 86 Riv. Dir. Int. 5, 24–25, commenting 
upon the Saiga (No. 2) judgment. A different opinion is also expressed by Drenan, ‘Gone 
Overboard: Why the Arctic Sunrise Case Signals an Over-Expansion of the Ship-As-A-Unit 
Concept in the Diplomatic Protection Context’ 129–130, who maintains that in the Arctic 
Sunrise case only the Russian crewmembers ‘should have been forced to exhaust their 
remedies in domestic Russian courts before the Netherlands was permitted to espouse 
claims on their behalf at the international level’.
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the applicability of the local remedies rule to its claim of diplomatic protection, 
especially because the rights allegedly violated were the same for all claims 
of standing made by the Netherlands. The Tribunal, instead, simply took for 
granted the purely direct nature of all the claims advanced by the Applicant.
The fact that the ‘ship-as-a-unit’ doctrine does not automatically entail 
an exemption from the local remedies rule finds some support in the recent 
practice of unclos Tribunals. In the Duzgit Integrity award, the arbitral Tri-
bunal acknowledged that ‘[w]hile Malta has characterized its claim as one of 
diplomatic protection, it has also invoked its rights as a flag State under the 
Convention’.103 After being satisfied that the obligations allegedly violated 
were owed by São Tomé to Malta under the Convention, it then accepted, by 
resorting to the ship-as-a-unit concept, that Malta had standing to bring claims 
in respect of alleged violations of its rights under the Convention which re-
sulted in damage to all private entities involved or interested in the vessel’s 
operations, regardless their nationality. At this point, unlike the Arctic Sunrise 
decision, where the arbitral Tribunal supposed the nature exclusively direct of 
all the claims, the Duzgit Integrity Tribunal correctly held as follows:
Once determined that Malta has standing to bring the current claims 
under the Convention, in order to decide whether the requirement of 
exhaustion of local remedies is still to be met, it must be clarified whether 
Malta’s claims are preponderantly for injury to its direct or indirect rights, 
namely, for injury to its rights as the flag State of the vessel in relation to 
damages incurred by it.104
In other words, the Tribunal recognized that it was not enough for the Ap-
plicant to claim the breach of its own rights and/or resort to the ‘ship-as-a-
unit’ concept in order to escape from the local remedies rule. Rather, it had 
to determine which elements of injury to its direct or indirect rights were 
preponderant.105
103 Duzgit Integrity Arbitration, Award, para. 147.
104 Ibid., para. 151 (emphasis added).
105 It is worth recalling that this line of reasoning was also recently endorsed by the Respon-
dent in the abovementioned M/V Norstar case. As clearly stated by Italy: ‘One of the ele-
ments associating the two situations pertaining to the State of nationality in the field 
of diplomatic protection, on the one hand, and to the flag State of a ship when seeking 
redress for the injury suffered by ‘the ship, everything on it and every person involved or 
interested in its operations’, on the other, is their espousal nature. The claims put forward 
by the State of nationality or by the flag State under such circumstances are equally ‘in-
direct’ in nature. Accordingly, when a claim is lodged by the flag State, preponderantly, if 
Downloaded from Brill.com11/28/2019 03:10:37PM
via Universite degli Studi di Milano
61Determining the Scope of the Local Remedies Rule
v Concluding Remarks
As Art. 295 unclos clearly indicates, the local remedies rule is meant to func-
tion within the law of the sea regime where international law so requires. The 
present article has examined how unclos Part xv Tribunals approached 
objections of admissibility based on this provision and, more generally, how 
such tribunals attempted to answer the question of when the local remedies 
rule is in principle applicable in cases where private entities are involved in 
unclos disputes. As seen, this question essentially concerns the scope of the 
local remedies rule and intersects with the broader problem of the applicabil-
ity of such rule to mixed claims. Accordingly, in this article the relevant case 
law has been assessed through the lens of the present state of international 
law on the subject and the corresponding works of the ilc. From this point 
of view, the survey of unclos Tribunals’ practice on the issue has revealed a 
quite controversial and uncontrolled use of the argument based on the direct 
character of the claim because of an alleged violation of an unclos provision 
formally giving rights to States. For the reasons stated above this approach is 
hardly convincing.
One might speculate why unclos Tribunals keep on taking such an ap-
proach in addressing the issue of mixed claims in relation to the local remedies 
rule since the very first case where the question arose. A possible reason could 
lie in a strong reluctance of such tribunals to be engaged in an evaluation of 
the remedies available in domestic legal orders, which might turn out a rather 
difficult task for the international judge. However, a reason of this kind could 
not justify the presumption of the direct nature of all claims grounded on un-
clos provisions conferring rights to States. It is hard to admit that the scope of 
application of the local remedies rule could be totally compressed for merely 
practical reasons. Such rule still remains an important principle of customary 
international law that ultimately rests on State sovereignty.106
not exclusively, to seek redress for the individuals involved in the operation of the ship, 
the local remedies rule applies on the same grounds as in a diplomatic protection case’. 
Cf. Written Observations and Submissions of the Republic of Italy to Observations and 
Submissions of the Republic of Panama, para. 98, quoting Saiga (No. 2) para. 106. See also, 
M/V Norstar, Judgment, para. 235. In its judgment, however, the Tribunal did not take a 
stand on the issue.
106 As Judge Córdova put it in his Separate Opinion appended to the icj judgment in the 
Interhandel case, ‘[t]he main reason for its existence lies in the indispensable necessity 
to harmonize the international and the national jurisdictions – assuring in this way the 
respect due to the sovereign jurisdiction of States – by which nationals and foreigners 
have to abide and to the diplomatic protection of the Governments to which only foreign-
ers are entitled. This harmony, this respect for the sovereignty of States is brought about 
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Potentially, the case law of unclos Tribunals could greatly contribute to 
shed light on the complicated issue of mixed claims in international dispute 
settlement. As seen, law of the sea disputes offer frequent occasions to deal 
with these kinds of claims and, even more than the icj, unclos Tribunals are 
among inter-state tribunals that are constantly called to face them. However, 
in holding this questionable method when addressing mixed claims, such tri-
bunals not only have missed an opportunity to add to the development of the 
law on the subject. By narrowing down one of the most traditional conditions 
of admissibility of cases, they also risk fuelling the arguments of an excessive 
‘expansion’ of their jurisdiction. Recent cases have triggered a number of criti-
cisms in this sense.107 Although relating to different set of procedural issues, 
the core argument that can be deduced from these criticisms is that in the case 
law of unclos Tribunals there is an ongoing trend to overly stretch the condi-
tions to resort to unclos Part xv procedures. The approach towards the local 
remedies rule here analysed apparently falls within this trend. And the fact 
that such approach lacks in legal reasoning does not certainly contribute to the 
legitimacy of judicial bodies that follow it.
A change of course with respect to the applicability of the local remedies 
rule is thus called for. A more thorough enquiry by unclos Tribunals to prop-
erly characterize disputes brought before them is needed so as not to add fur-
ther to the impression that the preconditions of jurisdiction and admissibility 
are at complete disposal of the claimant parties or of unclos Tribunals’ un-
reasoned discretion.
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